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Abstract—We consider a cognitive radio (CR) network consist-
ing of a secondary transmitter (ST), a secondary destination (SD)
and multiple secondary relays (SRs) in the presence of an eaves-
dropper, where the ST transmits to the SD with the assistance of
SRs, while the eavesdropper attempts to intercept the secondary
transmission. We rely on careful relay selection for protecting
the ST-SD transmission against the eavesdropper with the aid of
both single-relay and multi-relay selection. To be specific, only
the “best” SR is chosen in the single-relay selection for assisting
the secondary transmission, whereas the multi-relay selection
invokes multiple SRs for simultaneously forwarding the ST’s
transmission to the SD. We analyze both the intercept probability
and outage probability of the proposed single-relay and multi-
relay selection schemes for the secondary transmission relying
on realistic spectrum sensing. We also evaluate the performance
of classic direct transmission and artificial noise based methods
for the purpose of comparison with the proposed relay selection
schemes. It is shown that as the intercept probability requirement
is relaxed, the outage performance of the direct transmission, the
artificial noise based and the relay selection schemes improves,
and vice versa. This implies a trade-off between the security
and reliability of the secondary transmission in the presence
of eavesdropping attacks, which is referred to as the security-
reliability trade-off (SRT). Furthermore, we demonstrate that
the SRTs of the single-relay and multi-relay selection schemes
are generally better than that of classic direct transmission,
explicitly demonstrating the advantage of the proposed relay
selection in terms of protecting the secondary transmissions
against eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, as the number of SRs
increases, the SRTs of the proposed single-relay and multi-relay
selection approaches significantly improve. Finally, our numerical
results show that as expected, the multi-relay selection scheme
achieves a better SRT performance than the single-relay selection.
Index Terms—Security-reliability trade-off, relay selection,
intercept probability, outage probability, eavesdropping attack,
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cognitive radio.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE security aspects of cognitive radio (CR) systems [1]-[3] have attracted increasing attention from the research
community. Indeed, due to the highly dynamic nature of
the CR network architecture, legitimate CR devices become
exposed to both internal as well as to external attackers and
hence they are extremely vulnerable to malicious behavior. For
example, an illegitimate user may intentionally impose inter-
ference (i.e. jamming) for the sake of artificially contaminating
the CR environment [4]. Hence, the CR users fail to accurately
characterize their surrounding radio environment and may
become misled or compromised, which leads to a malfunction.
Alternatively, an illegitimate user may attempt to tap the
communications of authorized CR users by eavesdropping, in
order to intercept confidential information.
Clearly, CR networks face diverse security threats during
both spectrum sensing [5], [6] as well as spectrum sharing
[7], spectrum mobility [8] and spectrum management [9].
Extensive studies have been carried out for protecting CR
networks both against primary user emulation (PUE) [10] and
against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [11]. In addition to
PUE and DoS attacks, eavesdropping is another main concern
in protecting the data confidentiality [12], although it has
received less attention in the literature on CR network security.
Traditionally, cryptographic techniques are employed for guar-
anteeing transmission confidentiality against an eavesdropping
attack. However, this introduces a significant computational
overhead [13] as well as imposing additional system complex-
ity in terms of the secret key management [14]. Furthermore,
the existing cryptographic approaches are not perfectly secure
and can still be decrypted by an eavesdropper (E), provided
that it has the capacity to carry out exhaustive key search with
the aid of brute-force attack [15].
Physical-layer security [16], [17] is emerging as an efficient
approach for defending authorized users against eavesdropping
attacks by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless
channels. In [17], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman demon-
strated that perfectly secure and reliable transmission can be
achieved, when the wiretap channel spanning from the source
to the eavesdropper is a further degraded version of the main
channel between the source and destination. They also showed
that the maximal secrecy rate achieved at the legitimate desti-
nation, which is termed the secrecy capacity, is the difference
between the capacity of the main channel and that of the
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wiretap channel. In [18]-[20], the secrecy capacity limits of
wireless fading channels were further developed and character-
ized from an information-theoretic perspective, demonstrating
the detrimental impact of wireless fading on the physical-
layer security. In order to combat the fading effects, both
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) schemes [21], [22] as
well as cooperative relaying [23]-[25] and beamforming tech-
niques [26], [27] were investigated for the sake of enhancing
the achievable wireless secrecy capacity. Although extensive
research efforts were devoted to improving the security of
traditional wireless networks [16]-[27], less attention has been
dedicated to CR networks. In [28] and [29], the achievable
secrecy rate of the secondary transmission was investigated
under a specific quality-of-service (QoS) constraint imposed
on the primary transmission. Additionally, an overview of the
physical-layer security aspects of CR networks was provided
in [30], where several security attacks as well as the related
countermeasures are discussed. In contrast to conventional
non-cognitive wireless networks, the physical-layer security
of CR networks has to consider diverse additional challenges,
including the protection of the primary user’s QoS and the
mitigation of the mutual interference between the primary and
secondary transmissions.
Motivated by the above considerations, we explore the
physical-layer security of a CR network comprised of a
secondary transmitter (ST) communicating with a secondary
destination (SD) with the aid of multiple secondary relays
(SRs) in the presence of an unauthorized attacker. Our main
focus is on investigating the security-reliability trade-off (SRT)
of the cognitive relay transmission in the presence of realistic
spectrum sensing. The notion of the SRT in wireless physical-
layer security was introduced and examined in [31], where
the security and reliability was characterized in terms of the
intercept probability and outage probability, respectively. In
contrast to the conventional non-cognitive wireless networks
studied in [31], the SRT analysis of CR networks presented
in this work additionally takes into account the mutual inter-
ference between the primary user (PU) and secondary user
(SU).
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• We propose two relay selection schemes, namely both
single-relay and multi-relay selection, for protecting the
secondary transmissions against eavesdropping attacks.
More specifically, in the single-relay selection (SRS)
scheme, only a single relay is chosen from the set of
multiple SRs for forwarding the secondary transmissions
from the ST to the SD. By contrast, the multi-relay
selection (MRS) scheme employs multiple SRs for si-
multaneously assisting the ST-SD transmissions.
• We present the mathematical SRT analysis of the pro-
posed SRS and MRS schemes in the presence of realistic
spectrum sensing. Closed-form expressions are derived
for the intercept probability (IP) and outage probability
(OP) of both schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fad-
ing channels. The numerical SRT results of conventional
direct transmission and artificial noise based schemes are
also provided for comparison purposes.
PU
Secondary
network
Primary 
network
ST
PBS PU
SD
E
PBS: Primary Base Station PU: Primary User
E: Eavesdropper
ST: Secondary Transmitter SD: Secondary Destination
Fig. 1. A primary wireless network in coexistence with a secondary CR
network.
• It is shown that as the spectrum sensing reliability is in-
creased and/or the false alarm probability is reduced, the
SRTs of both the SRS and MRS schemes are improved.
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed SRS
and MRS schemes generally outperform the conventional
direct transmission and artificial noise based approaches
in terms of their SRTs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of physical-layer security in CR
networks in the context of both the direct transmission as well
as the SRS and MRS schemes. In Section III, we analyze the
SRTs of these schemes in the presence of realistic spectrum
sensing over Rayleigh fading channels. Next, numerical SRT
results of the direct transmission, SRS and MRS schemes
are given in Section IV, where the SRT performance of the
artificial noise based scheme is also numerically evaluated
for comparison purposes. Finally, Section V provides our
concluding remarks.
II. RELAY SELECTION AIDED PROTECTION AGAINST
EAVESDROPPING IN CR NETWORKS
We first introduce the overall system model of physical-
layer security in CR networks. We then present the signal
model of the conventional direct transmission approach, which
will serve as our benchmarker, as well as of the SRS and
MRS schemes for improving the CR system’s security against
eavesdropping attacks.
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a primary network in
coexistence with a secondary network (also referred to as a CR
network). The primary network includes a primary base station
(PBS) and multiple primary users (PUs), which communicate
with the PBS over the licensed spectrum. By contrast, the
secondary network consisting of one or more STs and SDs
exploits the licensed spectrum in an opportunistic way. To
be specific, a particular ST should first detect with the aid
of spectrum sensing whether or not the licensed spectrum is
occupied by the PBS. If so, the ST is not at liberty to transmit
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in order to avoid interfering with the PUs. If alternatively,
the licensed spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied (i.e. a
spectrum hole is detected), then the ST may transmit to the
SD over the detected spectrum hole. Meanwhile, E attempts
to intercept the secondary transmission from the ST to the
SD. For notational convenience, let H0 and H1 represent the
event that the licensed spectrum is unoccupied and occupied by
the PBS during a particular time slot, respectively. Moreover,
let Hˆ denote the status of the licensed spectrum detected by
spectrum sensing. Specifically, Hˆ = H0 represents the case
that the licensed spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, while
Hˆ = H1 indicates that the licensed spectrum is deemed to be
occupied.
The probability Pd of correct detection of the presence
of PBS and the associated false alarm probability Pf are
defined as Pd = Pr(Hˆ = H1|H1) and Pf = Pr(Hˆ = H1|H0),
respectively. Due to the background noise and fading effects,
it is impossible to achieve perfectly reliable spectrum sensing
without missing the detection of an active PU and without
false alarm, which suggests that a spectral band is occupied
by a PU, when it is actually unoccupied. Moreover, the missed
detection of the presence of PBS will result in interference
between the PU and SU. In order to guarantee that the
interference imposed on the PUs is below a tolerable level,
both the successful detection probability (SDP) Pd and false
alarm probability (FAP) Pf should be within a meaningful
target range. For example, the IEEE 802.22 standard requires
Pd > 0.9 and Pf < 0.1 [2]. For better protection of PUs,
we consider Pd = 0.99 and Pf = 0.01, unless otherwise
stated. Additionally, we consider a Rayleigh fading model for
characterizing all the channels between any two nodes of Fig.
1. Finally, all the received signals are assumed to be corrupted
by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) having a zero mean
and a variance of N0.
B. Direct Transmission
Let us first consider the conventional direct transmission as a
benchmark scheme. Let xp and xs denote the random symbols
transmitted by the PBS and the ST at a particular time instance.
Without loss of generality, we assume E[|xp|2] = E[|xs|2] =
1, where E[·] represents the expected value operator. The
transmit powers of the PBS and ST are denoted by Pp and
Ps, respectively. Given that the licensed spectrum is deemed
to be unoccupied by the PBS (i.e. Hˆ = H0), ST transmits its
signal xs at a power of Ps. Then, the signal received at the
SD can be written as
yd = hsd
√
Psxs + hpd
√
αPpxp + nd, (1)
where hsd and hpd represent the fading coefficients of the
channel spanning from ST to SD and that from PBS to SD,
respectively. Furthermore, nd represents the AWGN received
at SD and the random variable (RV) α is defined as
α =
{
0, H0
1, H1,
(2)
where H0 represents that the licensed spectrum is unoccupied
by PBS and no primary signal is transmitted, leading to α = 0.
PU
Secondary
network
Primary 
network
PBS PU
SDST
 . . .
SRs
E
SRs: Secondary Relays
Fig. 2. A cognitive relay network consists of one ST, one SD and N SRs
in the presence of an E.
By contrast, H1 represents that PBS is transmitting its signal
xp over the licensed spectrum, thus α = 1. Meanwhile, due
to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the ST’s
signal will be overheard by E and the overheard signal can
be expressed as
ye = hse
√
Psxs + hpe
√
αPpxp + ne, (3)
where hse and hpe represent the fading coefficients of the
channel spanning from ST to E and that from PBS to E,
respectively, while ne represents the AWGN received at E.
Upon combining Shannon’s capacity formula [31] with (1),
we obtain the capacity of the ST-SD channel as
Csd = log2(1 +
|hsd|2γs
α|hpd|2γp + 1
), (4)
where γs = Ps/N0 and γp = Pp/N0. Similarly, the capacity
of the ST-E channel is obtained from (3) as
Cse = log2(1 +
|hse|2γs
α|hpe|2γp + 1
). (5)
C. Single-Relay Selection
In this subsection, we consider the cognitive relay network
of Fig. 2, where both SD and E are assumed to be beyond the
coverage area of the ST [24], [25], and N secondary relays
(SRs) are employed for assisting the cognitive ST-SD transmis-
sion. We assume that a common control channel (CCC) [6] is
available for coordinating the actions of the different network
nodes and the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying using two
adjacent time slots is employed. More specifically, once the
licensed spectrum is deemed to be unoccupied, the ST first
broadcasts its signal xs to the N SRs, which attempt to decode
xs from their received signals. For notational convenience, let
D represent the set of SRs that succeed in decoding xs. Given
N SRs, there are 2N possible subsets D, thus the sample space
of D is formulated as
Ω = {∅,D1,D2, · · · ,Dn, · · · ,D2N−1} , (6)
where ∅ represents the empty set and Dn represents the n-th
non-empty subset of the N SRs. If the set D is empty, implying
that no SR decodes xs successfully, then all the SRs remain
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silent and thus both SD and E are unable to decode xs in this
case. If the set D is non-empty, a specific SR is chosen from
D to forward its decoded signal xs to SD. Therefore, given
Hˆ = H0 (i.e. the licensed spectrum is deemed unoccupied),
ST broadcasts its signal xs to N SRs at a power of Ps and a
rate of R. Hence, the signal received at a specific SRi is given
by
yi = hsi
√
Psxs + hpi
√
αPpxp + ni, (7)
where hsi and hpi represent the fading coefficients of the ST-
SRi channel and that of the PBS-SRi channel, respectively,
with ni representing the AWGN at SRi. From (7), we obtain
the capacity of the ST-SRi channel as
Csi =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hsi|
2γs
α|hpi|2γp + 1
), (8)
where the factor 12 arises from the fact that two orthogonal time
slots are required for completing the message transmission
from ST to SD via SRi. According to Shannon’s coding
theorem, if the data rate is higher than the channel capac-
ity, the receiver becomes unable to successfully decode the
source signal, regardless of the decoding algorithm adopted.
Otherwise, the receiver can succeed in decoding the source
signal. Thus, using (8), we can describe the event of D = ∅
as
Csi < R, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. (9)
Meanwhile, the event of D = Dn is described as
Csi > R, i ∈ Dn
Csj < R, j ∈ D¯n,
(10)
where D¯n represents the complementary set of Dn. Without
loss of generality, we assume that SRi is chosen within Dn
to transmit its decoded result xs at a power of Ps, thus the
signal received at SD can be written as
yd = hid
√
Psxs + hpd
√
αPpxp + nd, (11)
where hid represents the fading coefficient of the SRi-SD
channel. From (11), the capacity of the SRi-SD channel is
given by
Cid =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hid|2γs
α|hpd|2γp + 1
), (12)
where i ∈ Dn. In general, the specific SRi having the highest
instantaneous capacity to SD is chosen as the “best” SR
for assisting the ST’s transmission. Therefore, the best relay
selection criterion is expressed from (12) as
Best SR = arg max
i∈Dn
Cid = arg max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2, (13)
which shows that only the channel state information (CSI)
|hid|2 is required for performing the relay selection without the
need for the eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge. Upon combining
(12) and (13), we obtain the capacity of the channel spanning
from the “best” SR to SD as
Cbd =
1
2
log2(1 +
γs
α|hpd|2γp + 1
max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2), (14)
where the subscript ‘b’ in Cbd denotes the best SR. It is
observed from (14) that the legitimate transmission capacity
of the SRS scheme is determined by the maximum of inde-
pendent random variables (RVs) |hid|2 for different SRs. By
contrast, one can see from (4) that the capacity of classic
direct transmission is affected by the single RV |hsd|2. If
all RVs |hid|2 and |hsd|2 are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d), it would be most likely that max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 is
much higher than |hsd|2 for a sufficiently large number of
SRs, resulting in a performance improvement for the SRS
scheme over the classic direct transmission. However, if the
RVs |hid|2 and |hsd|2 are non-identically distributed and the
mean value of |hsd|2 is much higher than that of |hid|2,
then it may be more likely that max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 is smaller than
|hsd|2 for a given number of SRs. In this extreme case, the
classic direct transmission may perform better than the SRS
scheme. It is worth mentioning that in practice, the average
fading gain of the SRi-SD channel, |hid|2, should not be
less than that of the ST-SD channel |hsd|2, since SRs are
typically placed in the middle between the ST and SD. Hence,
a performance improvement for the SRS scheme over classic
direct transmission would be achieved in practical wireless
systems. Note that although a factor 12 in (14) is imposed
on the capacity of the main channel, it would not affect the
performance of the SRS scheme from a SRT perspective, since
the capacity of the wiretap channel is also multiplied by 12 as
will be shown in (16).
Additionally, given that the selected SR transmits its de-
coded result xs at a power of Ps, the signal received at E is
expressed as
ye = hbe
√
Psxs + hpe
√
αPpxp + ne, (15)
where hbe and hpe represent the fading coefficients of the
channel from “best” SR to E and that from PBS to E,
respectively. From (15), the capacity of the channel spanning
from the “best” SR to E is given by
Cbe =
1
2
log2(1 +
|hbe|2γs
α|hpe|2γp + 1
), (16)
where b ∈ Dn is determined by the relay selection criterion
given in (13). As shown in (16), the eavesdropper’s channel
capacity is affected by the channel state information (CSI)
|hbe|2 of the wiretap channel spanning from the “best” relay
to the eavesdropper. However, one can see from (13) that
the best relay is selected from the decoding set Dn solely
based on the main channel’s CSI |hid|2 i.e. without taking
into account the eavesdropper’s CSI knowledge of |hie|2.
This means that the selection of the best relay aiming for
maximizing the legitimate transmission capacity of (14) would
not lead to significantly beneficial or adverse impact on the
eavesdropper’s channel capacity, since the main channel and
the wiretap channel are independent of each other.
For example, if the random variables (RVs) |hie|2 related to
the different relays are i.i.d, we can readily infer by the law of
total probability that |hbe|2 has the same probability density
function (PDF) as |hie|2, implying that the eavesdropper’s
channel capacity of (16) is not affected by the selection of the
best relay given by (13). Therefore, the SRS scheme has no
obvious advantage over the classic direct transmission in terms
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of minimizing the capacity of the wiretap channel. To elaborate
a little further, according to the SRT trade-off, a reduction of
the outage probability (OP) due to the capacity enhancement
of the main channel achieved by using the selection of the
best relay would be converted into an intercept probability (IP)
improvement, which will be numerically illustrated in Section
IV.
D. Multi-Relay Selection
This subsection presents a MRS scheme, where multiple
SRs are employed for simultaneously forwarding the source
signal xs to SD. To be specific, ST first transmits xs to N SRs
over a detected spectrum hole. As mentioned in Subsection II-
C, we denote by D the set of SRs that successfully decode
xs. If D is empty, all SRs fail to decode xs and will not
forward the source signal, thus both SD and E are unable
to decode xs. If D is non-empty (i.e. D = Dn), all SRs
within Dn are utilized for simultaneously transmitting xs to
SD. This differs from the SRS scheme, where only a single
SR is chosen from Dn for forwarding xs to SD. In order to
make effective use of multiple SRs, a weight vector denoted
by w = [w1, w2, · · · , w|Dn|]T is employed at the SRs for
transmitting xs, where |Dn| is the cardinality of the set Dn.
For the sake of a fair comparison with the SRS scheme in
terms of power consumption, the total transmit power across
all SRs within Dn shall be constrained to Ps and thus the
weight vector w should be normalized according to ||w|| = 1.
Thus, given D = Dn and considering that all SRs within Dn
are selected for simultaneously transmitting xs with a weight
vector w, the signal received at SD is expressed as
ymultid =
√
Psw
THdxs +
√
αPphpdxp + nd, (17)
where Hd = [h1d, h2d, · · · , h|Dn|d]T . Similarly, the signal
received at E can be written as
ymultie =
√
Psw
THexs +
√
αPphpexp + ne, (18)
where He = [h1e, h2e, · · · , h|Dn|e]T . From (17) and (18), the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at SD and E
are, respectively, given by
SINRmultid =
γs
α|hpd|2γp + 1
|wTHd|
2, (19)
and
SINRmultie =
γs
α|hpe|2γp + 1
|wTHe|
2. (20)
In this work, the weight vector w is optimized by maximizing
the SINR at SD, yielding
max
w
SINRmultid , s.t. ||w|| = 1, (21)
where the constraint is used for normalization purposes. Using
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [32], we can readily obtain the
optimal weight vector wopt from (21) as
wopt =
H∗d
|Hd|
, (22)
which indicates that the optimal vector design only requires
the SR-SD CSI Hd, whilst dispensing with the eavesdropper’s
CSI He. Substituting the optimal vector wopt from (22) into
(19) and (20) and using Shannon’s capacity formula, we can
obtain the channel capacities achieved at both SD and E as
Cmultid =
1
2
log2(1 +
γs
αγp|hpd|2 + 1
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2), (23)
and
Cmultie =
1
2
log2(1 +
γs
αγp|hpe|2 + 1
|HHd He|
2
|Hd|2
), (24)
for D = Dn, where H represents the Hermitian transpose.
One can observe from (14) and (23) that the difference
between the capacity expressions Cbd and Cmultid only lies
in the fact that the maximum of RVs |hid|2 for different
SRs (i.e., max
i∈Dn
|hid|2) is used for the SRS scheme, while
the sum of RVs |hid|2 (i.e.,
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2) is employed for the
MRS scheme. Clearly, we have
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 > max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2
,
resulting in a performance gain for MRS over SRS in terms
of maximizing the legitimate transmission capacity. Moreover,
since the main channel Hd and the wiretap channel He are
independent of each other, the optimal weights assigned for
the multiple relays based on Hd will only slightly affect the
eavesdropper’s channel capacity. This means that the MRS
and SRS schemes achieve more or less the same performance
in terms of the capacity of the wiretap channel. Nevertheless,
given a fixed outage requirement, the MRS scheme can achieve
a better intercept performance than the SRS scheme, because
according to the SRT, an outage reduction achieved by the
capacity enhancement of the legitimate transmission relying on
the MRS would be converted into an intercept improvement.
To be specific, given an enhanced capacity of the legitimate
transmission, we may increase the data rate R based on the
OP definition of (25) for maintaining a fixed OP, which, in
turn leads to a reduction of the IP, since a higher data rate
would result in a lower IP, according to the IP definition of
(26).
It needs to be pointed out that in the MRS scheme, a
high-complexity symbol-level synchronization is required for
multiple distributed SRs, when simultaneously transmitting
to SD, whereas the SRS does not require such a complex
synchronization process. Thus, the performance improvement
of MRS over SRS is achieved at the cost of a higher
implementation complexity. Additionally, the synchronization
imperfections of the MRS scheme will impose a performance
degradation, which may even lead to a performance for the
MRS scheme becoming worse than that of the SRS scheme.
Throughout this paper, the Rayleigh model is used for char-
acterizing the fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.)
of wireless channels, which, in turn, implies that the fading
square magnitudes |hsd|2, |hsi|2 and |hid|2 are exponentially
distributed random variables (RVs). So far, we have completed
the presentation of the signal model of the direct transmission,
of the SRS, and of the MRS schemes for CR networks
applications in the presence of eavesdropping attacks.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 6
III. SRT ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
This section presents the SRT analysis of the direct trans-
mission, SRS and MRS schemes over Rayleigh fading chan-
nels. As discussed in [31], the security and reliability are
quantified in terms of the IP and OP experienced by the
eavesdropper and destination, respectively. It is pointed out
that in CR networks, ST starts to transmit its signal only when
an available spectrum hole is detected. Similarly to [34], the
OP and IP are thus calculated under the condition that the
licensed spectrum is detected to be unoccupied by the PBS.
The following gives the definition of OP and IP.
Definition 1: Let Cd and Ce represent the channel capacities
achieved at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively. The
OP and IP are, respectively, defined as
Pout = Pr(Cd < R|Hˆ = H0), (25)
and
Pint = Pr(Ce > R|Hˆ = H0), (26)
where R is the data rate.
A. Direct Transmission
Let us first analyze the SRT performance of the conventional
direct transmission. Given that a spectrum hole has been
detected, the OP of direct transmission is obtained from (25)
as
P directout = Pr(Csd < R|Hˆ = H0), (27)
where Csd is given by (4). Using the law of total probability,
we can rewrite (27) as
P directout = Pr(Csd < R,H0|Hˆ = H0)+Pr(Csd < R,H1|Hˆ = H0),
(28)
which can be further expressed as
P directout =Pr(Csd < R|H0, Hˆ = H0) Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0)
+ Pr(Csd < R|H1, Hˆ = H0) Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0).
(29)
It is shown from (2) that given H0 and H1, the parameter α is
obtained as α = 0 and α = 1, respectively. Thus, combining
(2) and (4), we have Csd = log2(1 + |hsd|2γs) given H0 and
Csd = log2(1 +
|hsd|
2γs
|hpd|2γp+1
) given H1. Substituting this result
into (29) yields
P directout =Pr(|hsd|
2γs < 2
R − 1)Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0)
+ Pr(
|hsd|2γs
|hpd|2γp + 1
< 2R − 1)Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0).
(30)
Moreover, the terms Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0) and Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0)
can be obtained by using Bayes’ theorem as
Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0) =
Pr(Hˆ = H0|H0) Pr(H0)∑
i∈{0,1}
Pr(Hˆ = H0|Hi) Pr(Hi)
=
P0(1− Pf )
P0(1 − Pf ) + (1− P0)(1 − Pd)
∆
= pi0,
(31)
and
Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0) =
(1− P0)(1− Pd)
P0(1− Pf ) + (1− P0)(1− Pd)
∆
= pi1,
(32)
where P0 = Pr(H0) is the probability that the licensed
spectrum band is unoccupied by PBS, while Pd = Pr(Hˆ =
H1|H1) and Pf = Pr(Hˆ = H1|H0) are the SDP and FAP,
respectively. For notational convenience, we introduce the
shorthand pi0 = Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0), pi1 = Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0) and
∆ = 2
R−1
γs
. Then, using (31) and (32), we rewrite (30) as
P directout = pi0 Pr(|hsd|
2 < ∆)+pi1 Pr(|hsd|
2 − |hpd|
2γp∆ < ∆).
(33)
Noting that |hsd|2 and |hpd|2 are independently and exponen-
tially distributed RVs with respective means of σ2sd and σ2pd,
we obtain
Pr(|hsd|
2 < ∆) = 1− exp(−
∆
σ2sd
), (34)
and
Pr(|hsd|
2−|hpd|
2γp∆ < ∆) = 1−
σ2sd
σ2pdγp∆+ σ
2
sd
exp(−
∆
σ2sd
).
(35)
Additionally, we observe from (26) that an intercept event
occurs, when the capacity of the ST-E channel becomes higher
than the data rate. Thus, given that a spectrum hole has been
detected (i.e. Hˆ = H0), ST starts transmitting its signal
to SD and E may overhear the ST-SD transmission. The
corresponding IP is given by
P directint = Pr(Cse > R|Hˆ = H0), (36)
which can be further expressed as
P directint =Pr(Cse > R|Hˆ = H0, H0) Pr(H0|Hˆ = H0)
+ Pr(Cse > R|Hˆ = H0, H1) Pr(H1|Hˆ = H0)
=pi0 Pr(|hse|
2 > ∆) + pi1 Pr(|hse|
2 − |hpe|
2γp∆ > ∆),
(37)
where the second equality is obtained by using Cse from (5).
Noting that RVs |hse|2 and |hpe|2 are exponentially distributed
and independent of each other, we can express the terms
Pr(|hse|2 > ∆) and Pr(|hse|2 − |hpe|2γp∆ > ∆) as
Pr(|hse|
2 > ∆) = exp(−
∆
σ2se
), (38)
and
Pr(|hse|
2 − |hpe|
2γp∆ > ∆) =
σ2se
σ2peγp∆+ σ
2
se
exp(−
∆
σ2se
),
(39)
where σ2se and σ2pe are the expected values of RVs |hse|2 and
|hpe|2, respectively.
B. Single-Relay Selection
In this subsection, we present the SRT analysis of the
proposed SRS scheme. Given Hˆ = H0, the OP of the cognitive
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transmission relying on SRS is given by
P singleout =Pr(Cbd < R,D = ∅|Hˆ = H0)
+
2N−1∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D = Dn|Hˆ = H0),
(40)
where Cbd represents the capacity of the channel from the
“best” SR to SD. In the case of D = ∅, no SR is chosen to
forward the source signal, which leads to Cbd = 0 for D = ∅.
Substituting this result into (40) gives
P singleout =Pr(D = ∅|Hˆ = H0)
+
2N−1∑
n=1
Pr(Cbd < R,D = Dn|Hˆ = H0).
(41)
Using (2), (9), (10) and (14), we can rewrite (41) as (42)
at the top of the following page, where Λ = 2
2R−1
γs
. Noting
that |hsi|2 and |hpi|2 are independent exponentially distributed
random variables with respective means of σ2si and σ2pi, we
have
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ) = 1− exp(−
Λ
σ2si
), (43)
and
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ) = 1−
σ2si
σ2piγpΛ + σ
2
si
exp(−
Λ
σ2si
),
(44)
where the terms Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ), Pr(|hsj |2 < Λ), and
Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be similarly determined in
closed-form. Moreover, based on Appendix A, we obtain
Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) and Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ|hpd|2γp + Λ) as
Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ) =
∏
i∈Dn
[
1− exp(−
Λ
σ2id
)
]
, (45)
and
Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ|hpd|
2γp + Λ)
= 1 +
2|Dn|−1∑
m=1
(−1)|D˜n(m)| exp(−
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λ
σ2id
)
× (1 +
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λγpσ
2
pd
σ2id
)−1,
(46)
where D˜n(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn.
Additionally, the IP of the SRS scheme can be expressed as
P singleint =Pr(Cbe > R,D = ∅|Hˆ = H0)
+
2N−1∑
n=1
Pr(Cbe > R,D = Dn|Hˆ = H0),
(47)
where Cbe represents the capacity of the channel spanning
from the “best” SR to E. Given D = ∅, we have Cbe = 0,
since no relay is chosen for forwarding the source signal. Thus,
substituting this result into (47) and using (2), (9), (10) and
(16), we arrive at
P
single
int =pi0
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ)
× Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ)
+ pi1
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
×
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ|hpj |
2γp + Λ)
× Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ),
(48)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ) and
Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be readily obtained by using
(43) and (44). Using the results in Appendix B, we can express
Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ) and Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp + Λ) as
Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ) =
∑
i∈Dn
exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
)
×

1 +
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|(1 +
∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

 ,
(49)
and
Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ) =
∑
i∈Dn
σ2ie
σ2peγpΛ + σ
2
ie
exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
)
×

1 +
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|(1 +
∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

 ,
(50)
where Cn(m) represents the m-th non-empty subset of Dn −
{i} and ‘−’ represents the set difference.
C. Multi-Relay Selection
This subsection analyzes the SRT of our MRS scheme for
transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. Similarly to (41),
the OP in this case is given by
Pmultiout = Pr(D = ∅| Hˆ = H0)
+
2N−1∑
n=1
Pr(Cmultid < R,D = Dn|Hˆ = H0).
(51)
Using (2), (9), (10) and (23), we can rewrite (51)
as (52) at the top of the following page, where
the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 < Λ),
Pr(|hsi|2 < Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ), Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ), Pr(|hsj |2 < Λ)
and Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) can be readily derived, as
shown in (43) and (44). However, it is challenging to obtain
the closed-form expressions of Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) and
Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2 + Λ). For simplicity, we assume
that the fading coefficients of all SRs-SD channels, i.e.
|hid|
2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, are i.i.d. RVs having the same
mean (average channel gain) denoted by σ2d = E(|hid|2).
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P
single
out =pi0
N∏
i=1
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ) + pi1
N∏
i=1
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
+ pi0
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ)Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ)
+ pi1
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ|hpj |
2γp + Λ)
× Pr(max
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ|hpd|
2γp + Λ),
(42)
Pmultiout =pi0
N∏
i=1
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ) + pi1
N∏
i=1
Pr(|hsi|
2 < Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
+ pi0
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ)Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ)
+ pi1
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ|hpj |
2γp + Λ)
× Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < γpΛ|hpd|
2 + Λ),
(52)
This assumption is widely used in the cooperative relaying
literature and it is valid in a statistical sense, provided that
all SRs are uniformly distributed over a certain geographical
area. Assuming that RVs of |hid|2 for i ∈ Dn are i.i.d., based
on Appendix C, we arrive at
Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < Λ) = Γ(
Λ
σ2d
, |Dn|), (53)
and
Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|
2 < γpΛ|hpd|
2 + Λ) = Γ(
Λ
σ2d
, |Dn|)
+
[1− Γ(Λσ−2d + σ
−2
pd γ
−1
p , |Dn|)]
(1 + σ2dσ
−2
pd γ
−1
p Λ−1)|Dn|
e1/(σ
2
pdγp),
(54)
where Γ(x, k) =
∫ x
0
tk−1
Γ(k) e
−tdt is known as the incomplete
Gamma function [32]. Substituting (53) and (54) into (52)
yields a closed-form OP expression for the proposed MRS
scheme.
Next, we present the IP analysis of the MRS scheme.
Similarly to (48), the IP of the MRS can be obtained from
(24) as
Pmultiint =pi0
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ)
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ)
× Pr(
|HHd He|
2
|Hd|2
> Λ)
+ pi1
2N−1∑
n=1
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hsi|
2 > Λ|hpi|
2γp + Λ)
×
∏
j∈D¯n
Pr(|hsj |
2 < Λ|hpj |
2γp + Λ)
× Pr(
|HHd He|
2
|Hd|2
> γpΛ|hpe|
2 + Λ),
(55)
where the closed-form expressions of Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ),
Pr(|hsj |2 < Λ), Pr(|hsi|2 > Λ|hpi|2γp + Λ) and
Pr(|hsj |2 < Λ|hpj |2γp + Λ) may be readily derived by
using (43) and (44). However, it is challenging to obtain
the closed-form solutions for Pr( |H
H
d He|
2
|Hd|2
> Λ) and
Pr(
|HHd He|
2
|Hd|2
> γpΛ|hpe|2 + Λ). Although finding a
general closed-form IP expression for the MRS scheme is
challenging, we can obtain the numerical IP results with the
aid of computer simulations.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present our performance comparisons
among the direct transmission, the SRS and MRS schemes
in terms of their SRT. To be specific, the analytic IP versus
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Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, the SRS and the MRS
schemes for different P0 with P0 = 0.8, γs ∈ [0, 35dB], N = 6, σ2sd =
σ2si = σ
2
id
= 1, σ2se = σ
2
ie = 0.1, and σ2pd = σ
2
pe = σ
2
pi = 0.2.
OP of the three schemes are obtained by plotting (33), (37),
(42), (48), (52) and (55). The simulated IP and OP results
of the three schemes are also given to verify the correctness
of the theoretical SRT analysis. In our computer simulations,
the fading amplitudes (e.g., |hsd|, |hsi|, |hid|, etc.) are first
generated based on the Rayleigh distribution having different
variances for different channels. Then, the randomly generated
fading amplitudes are substituted into the definition of an
outage (or intercept) event, which would determine whether
an outage (or intercept) event occurs or not. By repeatedly
achieving this process, we can calculate the relative frequency
of occurrence for an outage (intercept) event, which is the
simulated OP (or IP). Additionally, the SDP Pd and FAP Pf
are set to Pd = 0.99 and Pf = 0.01, unless otherwise stated.
The primary signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of γp = 10dB and
the data rate of R = 1bit/s/Hz are used in our numerical
evaluations.
The artificial noise based method [35], [36] is also consid-
ered for the purpose of numerical comparison with the relay
selection schemes. To be specific, in the artificial noise based
scheme, ST directly transmits its signal xs to SD, while N SRs
attempt to confuse the eavesdropper by sending an interfering
signal (referred to as artificial noise) that is approximately
designed to lie in the null-space of the legitimate main channel.
In this way, the artificial noise will impose interference on the
eavesdropper without affecting the SD. For a fair comparison,
the total transmit power of the desired signal xs and the arti-
ficial noise are constrained to Ps. Moreover, the equal power
allocation method [35] is used in the numerical evaluation.
Fig. 3 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, as
well as the SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.8, where the
solid lines and discrete marker symbols represent the analytic
and simulated results, respectively. It can be seen from Fig.
3 that the IP of the direct transmission, the artificial noise
based as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes all
improve upon tolerating a higher OP, implying that a trade-
off exists between the IP (security) and the OP (reliability)
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Fig. 4. IP versus OP of the SRS and MRS schemes for different P0 with
γs ∈ [0, 30dB], N = 6, σ2sd = σ2si = σ2id = 1, σ2se = σ2ie = 0.1, and
σ2
pd
= σ2pe = σ
2
pi = 0.2.
of CR transmissions. Fig. 3 also shows that both the proposed
SRS and MRS schemes outperform the direct transmission and
the artificial noise based approaches in terms of their SRT,
showing the advantage of exploiting relay selection against
the eavesdropping attack. Moreover, the SRT performance
of the MRS is better than that of the SRS. Although the
MRS achieves a better SRT performance than its SRS-aided
counterpart, this result is obtained at the cost of a higher
implementation complexity, since multiple SRs require high-
complexity symbol-level synchronization for simultaneously
transmitting to the SD, whereas the SRS does not require such
elaborate synchronization.
Fig. 4 illustrates our numerical SRT comparison between the
SRS and MRS schemes for P0 = 0.2 and P0 = 0.8. Observe
from Fig. 4 that the MRS scheme performs better than the SRS
in terms of its SRT performance for both P0 = 0.2 and P0 =
0.8. It is also seen from Fig. 4 that as P0 increases from 0.2
to 0.8, the SRT of both the SRS and MRS schemes improves.
This is because upon increasing P0, the licensed band becomes
unoccupied by the PUs with a higher probability and hence the
secondary users (SUs) have more opportunities for accessing
the licensed band for their data transmissions, which leads
to a reduction of the OP for CR transmissions. Meanwhile,
increasing P0 may simultaneously result in an increase of
the IP, since the eavesdropper also has more opportunities
for tapping the cognitive transmissions. However, in both the
SRS and MRS schemes, the relay selection is performed for
the sake of maximizing the legitimate transmission capacity
without affecting the eavesdropper’s channel capacity. Hence,
upon increasing P0, it becomes more likely that the reduction
of OP is more significant than the increase of IP, hence
leading to an overall SRT improvement for the SRS and MRS
schemes.
In Fig. 5, we depict the IP versus OP of the SRS and
MRS schemes for different spectrum sensing reliabilities,
where (Pd, Pf ) = (0.9, 0.1) and (Pd, Pf ) = (0.99, 0.01)
are considered. It is observed that as the spectrum sens-
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ing reliability is improved from (Pd, Pf ) = (0.9, 0.1) to
(Pd, Pf ) = (0.99, 0.01), the SRTs of the SRS and MRS
schemes improve accordingly. This is due to the fact that
for an improved sensing reliability, an unoccupied licensed
band would be detected more accurately and hence less mutual
interference occurs between the PUs and SUs, which results in
a better SRT for the secondary transmissions. Fig. 5 also shows
that for (Pd, Pf ) = (0.9, 0.1) and (Pd, Pf ) = (0.99, 0.01), the
MRS approach outperforms the SRS scheme in terms of the
SRT, which further confirms the advantage of the MRS for
protecting the secondary transmissions against eavesdropping
attacks.
Fig. 6 shows the IP versus OP of the conventional direct
transmission as well as of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes
for N = 2, N = 4, and N = 8. It is seen from Fig. 6 that the
SRTs of the proposed SRS and MRS schemes are generally
better than that of the conventional direct transmission for
N = 2, N = 4 and N = 8. Moreover, as the number of
SRs increases from N = 2 to 8, the SRT of the SRS and
MRS schemes significantly improves, explicitly demonstrating
the security and reliability benefits of exploiting multiple SRs
for assisting the secondary transmissions. In other words, the
security and reliability of the secondary transmissions can
be concurrently improved by increasing the number of SRs.
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 6, upon increasing the number
of SRs from N = 2 to 8, the SRT improvement of MRS
over SRS becomes more notable. Again, the SRT advantage
of the MRS over the SRS comes at the expense of requiring
elaborate symbol-level synchronization among the multiple
SRs for simultaneously transmitting to the SD.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed relay selection schemes for
a CR network consisting of a ST, a SD and multiple SRs
communicating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We ex-
amined the SRT performance of the SRS and MRS assisted
secondary transmissions in the presence of realistic spectrum
sensing, where both the security and reliability of secondary
transmissions are characterized in terms of their IP and OP,
respectively. We also analyzed the SRT of the conventional
direct transmission as a benchmark. It was illustrated that as
the spectrum sensing reliability increases, the SRTs of both
the SRS and MRS schemes improve. We also showed that
the proposed SRS and MRS schemes generally outperform
the conventional direct transmission and artificial noise based
approaches in terms of their SRT. Moreover, the SRT perfor-
mance of MRS is better than that of SRS. Additionally, as the
number of SRs increases, the SRTs of both the SRS and of
the MRS schemes improve significantly, demonstrating their
benefits in terms of enhancing both the security and reliability
of secondary transmissions.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (45) AND (46)
Letting |hid|2 = xi and |hpd|2 = y, the left hand side
of (45) and (46) can be rewritten as Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ) and
Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy + Λ), respectively. Noting that random
variables |hid|2 and |hpd|2 are exponentially distributed with
respective means σ2id and σ2pd, and independent of each other,
we obtain
Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λ) =
∏
i∈Dn
Pr(|hid|
2 < Λ)
=
∏
i∈Dn
[
1− exp(−
Λ
σ2id
)
]
,
(A.1)
which is (45). Similarly, the term Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy + Λ)
can be computed as
Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy + Λ)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2pd
exp(−
y
σ2pd
)
∏
i∈Dn
(1− exp(−
Λγpy + Λ
σ2id
))dy,
(A.2)
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wherein
∏
i∈Dn
(1 − exp(−Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
)) can be further expanded
as ∏
i∈Dn
(1− exp(−
Λγpy + Λ
σ2id
)) = 1
+
2|Dn|−1∑
m=1
(−1)|D˜n(m)| exp(−
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λγpy + Λ
σ2id
),
(A.3)
where |Dn| is the cardinality of set Dn, D˜n(m) represents the
m-th non-empty subset of Dn, and |D˜n(m)| is the cardinality
of set D˜n(m). Substituting
∏
i∈Dn
(1− exp(−Λγpy+Λ
σ2
id
)) from
(A.3) into (A.2) yields
Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy + Λ) =
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2pd
exp(−
y
σ2pd
)dy
+
2|Dn|−1∑
m=1
(−1)|D˜n(m)|
1
σ2pd
×
∫ ∞
0
exp(−
y
σ2pd
−
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λγpy + Λ
σ2id
)dy.
(A.4)
Finally, performing the integration of (A.4) yields
Pr(max
i∈Dn
xi < Λγpy + Λ) = 1
+
2|Dn|−1∑
m=1
(−1)|D˜n(m)| exp(−
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λ
σ2id
)
× (1 +
∑
i∈D˜n(m)
Λγpσ
2
pd
σ2id
)−1.
(A.5)
This completes the proof of (45) and (46).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (49) AND (50)
Given D = Dn, any SR within Dn can be selected as the
“best” relay for forwarding the source signal. Thus, using the
law of total probability, we have
Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ) =
∑
i∈Dn
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ, b = i)
=
∑
i∈Dn
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ, |hid|
2 > max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|
2)
=
∑
i∈Dn
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ)Pr( max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|
2 < |hid|
2),
(B.1)
where in the first line, variable ‘b’ stands for the best SR and
the second equality is obtained from (13) and ‘−’ represents
the set difference. Noting that |hie|2 is an exponentially
distributed random variable with a mean of σ2ie, we obtain
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ) = exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
). (B.2)
Letting |hjd|2 = xj and |hid|2 = y, we have
Pr( max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|
2 < |hid|
2)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2id
exp(−
y
σ2id
)
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
(1− exp(−
y
σ2jd
))dy,
(B.3)
wherein
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
(1 − exp(− y
σ2
jd
)) is expanded by
∏
j∈Dn−{i}
(1− exp(−
y
σ2jd
)) = 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)| exp(−
∑
j∈Cn(m)
y
σ2jd
),
(B.4)
where |Dn| denotes the cardinality of the set Dn and Cn(m)
represents the m-th non-empty subset of “Dn − {i}”. Com-
bining (B.3) and (B.4), we obtain
Pr( max
j∈Dn−{i}
|hjd|
2 < |hid|
2) = 1
+
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|(1 +
∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1.
(B.5)
Substituting (B.2) and (B.5) into (B.1) gives (B.6) at the top
of the following page, which is (49). Similarly to (B.1), we
can rewrite Pr(|hbe|2 > Λ|hpe|2γp + Λ) as
Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ)
=
∑
i∈Dn
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ)
× Pr( max
j∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|
2 < |hid|
2).
(B.7)
Since the random variables |hie|2 and |hpe|2 are independently
and exponentially distributed with respective means of σ2ie and
σ2pe, we readily arrive at
Pr(|hie|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ) =
σ2ie
σ2peγpΛ + σ
2
ie
exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
).
(B.8)
Substituting (B.5) and (B.8) into (B.7) gives (B.9) at the top
of the following page, which is (50).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (53) AND (54)
Upon introducing the notation of X =
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 and Y =
|hpd|2, we can rewrite the terms Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < Λ) and
Pr(
∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 < γpΛ|hpd|2 + Λ) as Pr(X < Λ) and Pr(X <
γpΛY + Λ), respectively. Noting that the fading coefficients
of all SR-SD channels, i.e. |hid|2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, are
assumed to be i.i.d., we obtain the probability density function
(PDF) of X = ∑
i∈Dn
|hid|2 as
fX(x) =
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1 exp(−
x
σ2d
), (C.1)
where σ2d = E(|hid|2). Meanwhile, the random variable Y =
|hpd|2 is exponentially distributed and its PDF is given by
fY (y) =
1
σ2pd
exp(−
y
σ2pd
), (C.2)
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Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ) =
∑
i∈Dn
exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
)

1 +
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|(1 +
∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

, (B.6)
Pr(|hbe|
2 > Λ|hpe|
2γp + Λ) =
∑
i∈Dn
σ2ie
σ2peγpΛ + σ
2
ie
exp(−
Λ
σ2ie
)

1 +
2|Dn|−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Cn(m)|(1 +
∑
j∈Cn(m)
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

 , (B.9)
where σ2pd = E(|hpd|2). Using (C.1), we arrive at
Pr(X < Λ) =
∫ Λ
0
1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
x|Dn|−1 exp(−
x
σ2d
)dx
=
∫ Λ
σ2
d
0
t|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)
exp(−t)dt
= Γ(
Λ
σ2d
, |Dn|),
(C.3)
where the second equality is obtained by substituting x
σ2
d
= t
and Γ(a, k) =
∫ a
0
tk−1
Γ(k) exp(−t)dt is known as the incomplete
Gamma function. Additionally, considering that the random
variables X and Y are independent of each other, we obtain
Pr(X < γpΛY + Λ) as
Pr(X < γpΛY + Λ) =
∫ Λ
0
fX(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
Λ
∫ ∞
x
γpΛ
− 1
γp
fX(x)fY (y)dxdy.
(C.4)
Substituting fX(x) and fY (y) from (C.1) and (C.2) into (C.4)
yields
Pr(X < γpΛY + Λ)
= Γ(
Λ
σ2d
, |Dn|) +
∫ ∞
Λ
e1/(σ
2
pdγp)x|Dn|−1
Γ(|Dn|)σ
2|Dn|
d
exp(−
x
σ2d
−
x
σ2pdγpΛ
)dx
= Γ(
Λ
σ2d
, |Dn|) +
[1− Γ(Λσ−2d + σ
−2
pd γ
−1
p , |Dn|)]
(1 + σ2dσ
−2
pd γ
−1
p Λ−1)|Dn|
e1/(σ
2
pdγp),
(C.5)
where the second equality is obtained by using x
σ2
d
+ x
σ2
pd
γpΛ
=
t. Hence, we have completed the proof of (53) and (54) as
(C.3) and (C.5), respectively.
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